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Abstract
CASEY DOUGAL: Small business performance and stock return predictability.
(Under the direction of Christian Lundblad.)
I find that growth in local proprietary income is positively correlated with the future stock
returns and cash flows of public firms headquartered nearby. This predictability is strongest
for firms in high-technology industries, for firms with more localized business operations, and
when proprietor financial constraints are relaxed as measured by changes in aggregate housing
prices. Proprietary income growth also predicts aggregate stock prices. There exists a com-
mon proprietary income growth factor across economic regions which pro-cyclically predicts
aggregate market returns. This factor is highly correlated with the Silicon Valley proprietary
income growth rate—which itself is a stronger predictor of aggregate returns than the dividend
yield or CAY.
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1. Introduction
Silicon Valley was born in 1939, when Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard founded HP in
Packard’s garage with an initial investment of $538. Their first product was an audio oscillator,
and one of their first customers was Walt Disney, who purchased eight oscillators to develop
the sound system for the movie Fantasia. Decades later, in the 1970s, Silicon Valley struggled
against increasing competition from Route 128 in Boston for supremacy in the high technology
industry. Fates diverged, however, and by the late ’80s Silicon Valley was forging ahead as the
global leader in high technology, while Route 128 stagnated.
What caused the divergence in these two local economies? In her comprehensive history
of these two regions, AnnaLee Saxenian (1994) notes that the key difference leading to this
divergent outcome was not resources or location, but that Silicon Valley, true to its roots,
created a culture that fostered entrepreneurship, while Route 128 did not. Today, Silicon
Valley continues to be the center of entrepreneurship and high-tech innovation in the United
States, accounting for more than one-third of its total venture capital.1 This paper explores
the benefits that accrue to public firms from being located near a vibrant entrepreneurial
economy.
Entrepreneurs play an vital role in making regions economically dynamic, in fact, “en-
trepreneurship...is one of the three great predictors of urban success” (Glaesar 2010). Here
I look at the impact of entrepreneurship on public firm outcomes. I find that entrepreneur
performance predicts the performance of neighboring public firms. Specifically, firms headquar-
tered in areas with the highest per proprietor (non-farm) proprietary income growth (hereafter
“proprietary income growth”) have significantly higher abnormal risk-adjusted annual returns
the following year than firms located in areas with the lowest proprietary income growth. This
1https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/moneytree/filesource/exhibits/Q1\%202010\
%20MoneyTree\%20Report.pdf
return difference does not reverse, but persists and cumulates over the subsequent 60 months.
Conversely, there is no evidence that firm performance leads local proprietary income growth.
Consistent with evidence that local proprietary income shocks lead real improvements to
neighboring firms, I find that growth in proprietary income also predicts growth in future
investment, R&D, assets, earnings, and cash flows for firms headquartered nearby. In related
research with Parsons and Titman (2012), we find that a firm’s investment co-moves with the
investments of other firms headquartered nearby, even those in very different industries. We
hypothesize that this co-movement is due to time-varying area-specific factors, e.g., investment
opportunities that are positively linked to local business conditions. Consistent with these
findings, I show that in addition to predicting the performance of neighboring public firms,
local proprietary income growth also predicts the performance of the entire local economy, i.e.,
growth in proprietary income predicts future wage growth per employee, future employment
growth, and future growth in the number of proprietors. Moreover, regions in which proprietary
income growth is higher have higher population on average compared to areas with lower
growth, and have significantly more firms per capita— indicating either a higher firm birth
rate or a lower firm death rate.
There are both non-causal and causal reasons to expect that proprietor performance would
forecast changes to its surrounding environment. A non-causal explanation is that proprietor
performance is a leading indicator for the local economy and subsequently for neighboring
public firms. For example, it is possible that, due to simpler operations and centralized decision
making, small entrepreneurial firms are more nimble when adjusting to economic shocks than
their larger, more bureaucratic corporate counterparts.
Alternatively, proprietors could be causally influencing their local economies via their ef-
fect on local entrepreneurship and innovation. Schumpeter (1934) originally theorized that
entrepreneurs were the driving force behind economic growth. Subsequently, multiple studies
have found a strong positive correlation between the number of small, entrepreneurial firms
and subsequent measures of growth (Glaeser et al. 1992; Rosenthal and Strange 2003, 2009;
and Glaeser and Kerr 2009). How might entrepreneurs spur development? One possibility is
through the key role they play in generating knowledge spill-overs (Audretsch 1995, Audretsch
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and Feldman 2003) which are a commonly-cited motivation for the increasing-returns-to-scale
production critical to endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, and Grossman and
Helpman 1991).2 Giving strength to this idea, Hsu (2011) constructs empirical proxies for
industrial and geographic spillovers using patent data, and finds a positive relation between
spillovers and future firm stock returns and profitability.
To dig deeper into the drivers behind proprietary income growth shocks, I investigate where
proprietary income growth’s predictive ability is strongest. I find that the average difference in
risk-adjusted returns for firms in high growth versus low growth areas increases monotonically
as the sample of firms is restricted to those with more localized business operations. The
average difference for firms with operations in fewer than five states is more than double that
for firms with operations in more than ten states, and completely disappears for firms with
business operations in more than 20 states. Similar attenuation is observed in firm cash flows.
This suggests that whatever is driving local proprietary income growth is predominantly local
in nature–i.e., it is probably not due to proprietors’ abilities to respond to aggregate shocks
faster than public firms. Moreover, while this does not rule out a non-causal explanation, it is
consistent with proximity’s significant role in generating knowledge spill-overs.3
Providing further evidence for a spillover-based explanation, I find that this predictability
is strongest in industries where the possession of knowledge plays a prominent role. Using
multiple proxies for industry human capital intensity, I find that the predictability is strongest
for firms in industries with high average patenting, high average wages, and high average R&D.
2To illustrate, consider the following scenario: When the returns to entrepreneurship are high (e.g., high
proprietary income), a worker may choose to exit the firm or university where they work in order to form a
new company. (See Lucas 1978, Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979, Holmes and Schmidt 1990, and Jovanovic 1994
for the model of entrepreneurial choice which suggests that individuals choose between earning their income
either through self-employment or through wage work.) However, when employees leave wage work for self-
employment, they take with them the knowledge, ideas, and skills from their previous employ. In this way
entrepreneurship plays an important function in appropriating knowledge from local firms. However, knowledge
transfer isn’t unidirectional. As entrepreneurs retain contacts from their previous job, they spread ideas and
knowledge back to the firm. Thus, entrepreneurship stimulates the creation of knowledge networks which
subsequently drives economic growth–improving business conditions for surrounding firms.
3For example, studies show that knowledge spillovers tend to be geographically bounded within the region
where new economic knowledge is created (Agrawal 2002a and 2002b, Anselin, Acs and Varga 1997; Orlando
2000; Autant-Bernard 2001; and Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993). As Gleasar et al. (1992) put it,
“intellectual breakthroughs must cross hallways and streets more easily than oceans and continents.”
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On the other hand, I investigate whether the predictability is due to proprietors responding
faster than public firms to industry shocks. For example, it may be that both proprietors and
public firms in Houston are predominantly oil-industry based firms. Thus, if Houston propri-
etors respond faster than Houston firms to an oil-industry shock, the observed predictability
would be explained. To check this, I classify regions by their dominant industries and then
see if the proprietary income growth rate from another region with the same dominant in-
dustry also predicts returns. For example, I check to see if the proprietary income growth
rate of Portland, an electronics industry hub, predicts Phoenix stock returns—another area
with a dominant electronics industry—the assumption being that a region’s dominant public
firm industry is also its dominant private firm industry. Overall, I find no evidence that the
predictability is due to proprietors’ responding faster than public firms to industry-specific
shocks.
Perhaps the strongest evidence that proprietors causally effect their environment is the
response of future returns to growth in proprietary income, conditional on the relaxing or
tightening of proprietor financial constraints. Research has shown that financial constraints
often dictate entrepreneurs’ decisions to expand their current business or for individuals to
become entrepreneurs.4 Housing prices are particularly important for proprietors in this regard
since they often use housing as collateral for loans (Black, de Meza, Jeffreys 1996). Using
aggregate housing price growth as a proxy for changes in proprietor financial constraints, I
find that conditional on increasing housing prices, i.e., when proprietors are less financially
constrained, the average risk-adjusted annual return for firms in high growth areas over the
return of firms in low-growth areas is more than double the unconditional predictability effect.
On the other hand, the average return difference is close to zero when housing prices are in
decline. This finding is somewhat surprising in the light of previous research, which finds
aggregate housing collateral unconditionally predicts countercyclical returns at both the state
and aggregate level (Kumar and Korniotis 2012; Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh 2005).
4See, for example, Black and Strahan 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan 2006; Kerr and Nanda 2009; and De-
myanyk, Ostergaard, and Srensen 2007; Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Gentry and Hubbard 1999; Fazzari, Hub-
bard, and Petersen 1988; and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994.
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While this conditional response to proprietary income growth does not imply causality,
it is interesting to note that regardless of what is creating the initial shock to proprietary
income, whether it be driven by proprietors themselves or as the response of proprietors to
outside forces, the positive effects of an increase to proprietary income on public firms only
exist when proprietors have access to financing. Thus, it is not the initial shock which causes
the proprietary income growth that influences firm performance, but rather the response of
the local economy following these shocks.
To summarize, local proprietary income growth predicts firm returns and news about future
firm cash flows. This predictability is strongest for firms whose business operations have a
limited geographic scope, firms in high technology industries, and when proprietor financial
constraints are relaxed. While this does not provide conclusive evidence for either a causal or
non-causal explanation for the predictability, it does suggest that proprietary income shocks are
driven by local technology shocks that propagate to firms via proprietors’ effect on their local
economies. Given these findings, I hypothesize that the observed local return predictability
is due to cash-flow news that is non-diversifiable in local portfolios, e.g., the spillover effects
generated by a new technology within an industry agglomeration. Moreover, as portions of
this non-diversifiable news accumulate at the aggregate level I hypothesize that there will be
a common factor across the local proprietary income growth rates of all regions, which will
pro-cyclically predict aggregate market returns.
Using factor analysis, I find such a factor. This factor explains 54% of local proprietary
income growth rate variation, and predicts aggregate market returns better than the dividend
yield or the consumption wealth ratio, CAY (Lettau and Ludvigson 2001a, b). Interestingly,
this factor is 81% correlated with the proprietary income growth of Silicon Valley, which
itself is a stronger predictor of aggregate market returns than the dividend yield or CAY.
Additionally, both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the predictive ability of
Silicon Valley’s proprietary income growth rate considerably increase conditional on weakening
proprietor financial constraints as measured by aggregate housing prices.
By examining the relationship between proprietor and public firm performance, I build on
two main literatures. First, these results add to the urban economics literature which studies
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the broad impacts on entrepreneurship on urban economies. The best piece of evidence for the
benefits of entrepreneurship on area growth is the strong connection between small average
firm size and subsequent growth (see Glaeser et al., 1992; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003 and
2009). However, as Gleasar, Rosenthal, and Strange (2010) emphasize, this literature has been
limited by the dearth of “exogenous variables that increase entrepreneurship but have no other
impact on the local economy.” My results add to this literature, but run into a similar problem
in establishing causality.
These results also contribute to the literature on stock return predictability. Since stock
prices equal the discounted values of future dividends, predictable variation in returns must
come either from predictable variation in cash flows or predictable variation in discount rates
(see Campbell and Shiller 1988; Campbell 1991). In particular, any variable that forecasts
higher returns must forecast either positive shocks to cash flows, like a positive unexpected
change in firm fundamentals, or negative shocks to discount rates, such as lower future risk
aversion or risk premia.
Typically, predictor variables measure business conditions and consequently posit counter-
cyclical return predictability: high future returns when business conditions are weak, and low
future returns when business conditions are strong (Campbell and Diebold 2009).5 Examples
of such variables include the default spread, term spread, dividend yield (Fama and French
1989), CAY (Lettau and Ludvigson 2001a, b), the ratio of housing wealth to human wealth
(Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh 2005), and the private investment rate (Cochrane 1991). Kumar
and Korniotis (2012) similarly find that U.S. state-level measures of business conditions—a
state’s relative unemployment rate or housing collateral ratio—predict counter-cyclical return
variation in state stock portfolios. Additionally, with the exception of CAY, there is little
evidence that any of these variables predict firm cash flows (Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi 2004,
Cochrane 2008, Vuolteenaho 2002). Consequently, research has overwhelmingly attributed
stock return predictability entirely to time-varying discount rates and not predictable cash
5Quoting Fama and French (1989), “One story for these results is that when business conditions are poor,
income is low and expected returns on bonds and stocks must be high to induce substitution from consumption
to investment. When times are good and income is high the market clears at lower levels of expected returns.”
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flow news (Cochrane 2010).6
However, there are exceptions to this rule. Variables that predict technology or productivity
shocks, i.e., systematic cash-flow shocks, are positively correlated with future returns and firm
profitability. These variables include firm productivity (Cochrane 1991, 1996; Liu, Whited,
and Zhang 2009, Balvers and Huang 2007), government investment in public sector physical
capital (Belo and Yu 2012), aggregate patenting and R&D (Hsu 2009), proxies for industry
and geographic knowledge spillovers (Hsu 2011), and various measures of R&D intensity (See
Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 2001; Lev and Sougiannis (1996); Eberhart et al. 2004;
Hirshleifer et al. 2010). Similar to these variables, growth in proprietary income growth
behaves most like a technology or productivity shock since it predicts pro-cyclical returns and
future firm fundamentals, with the majority of its predictive power being limited to firms in
high technology industries.
At their most basic level, my findings provide evidence that the performance of small
private firms leads the performance of larger public firms located nearby. However, viewed
more expansively, these results highlight the powerful effect a small minority of innovative
entrepreneurs can have on both local and aggregate firm performance—with a special emphasis
on the role Silicon Valley technological innovation has played over the past 40 years in driving
aggregate stock market performance.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows: Section II describes the data and method-
ology used throughout the paper. Section III reports stock return and firm fundamental
predictability results. Section IV reviews stock return predictability conditional on firms hav-
ing localized business operations, by industry human-capital intensity, and conditional on
changes in aggregate housing collateral. Section V examines local proprietary income’s ability
to predict the aggregate stock market, and Section VI concludes.
6In a recent paper, Vuolteenaho (2002) explains why aggregate returns are typically predicted by discount
rates and not cash flows. He finds that cash-flow news is highly idiosyncratic, while expected-return news is
highly correlated across firms. Thus, while most variation in individual stock returns is due to news about future
cash flows, these variations are largely diversified away in aggregate portfolios, while expected-return-news is
not. Subsequently, he argues that discount rate movements drive aggregate returns.
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2. Data description and summary statistics
The data used in this paper consists of all public companies listed on the NYSE, NAS-
DAQ, or AMEX between January 1970 and December 2009. For each of these firms, I obtain
monthly common stock returns from CRSP, and annual firm fundamental data and firm head-
quarter location (ADDZIP) from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged Database. To minimize
the influence of outliers all firm stock returns and fundamental data are winsorized at the one
percent level. Financial firms and regulated utility firms are dropped from the sample.
The economic region of interest is the Economic Area, hereafter EA, as defined by the
United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The United States consists of 179 mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive EAs. Figure 1 shows a map delineating these regions.
An EA is defined as “the relevant regional markets surrounding metropolitan or micropolitan
statistical areas,” and are “mainly determined by labor commuting patterns that delineate
local labor markets and that also serve as proxies for local markets where businesses in the
areas sell their products.”7 EAs are chosen as the geographic unit of observation since they
are defined according to labor market boundaries. There is little research as to how far
knowledge spill-overs spread; however, focusing on regional labor markets as opposed to cities
seems reasonable given that many industry agglomerations, for example Silicon Valley or the
Research Triangle in North Carolina, span multiple cities.
Firm location is determined by the residence of their corporate headquarters. Firms are
matched to EAs using their headquarter zip code listed on COMPUSTAT. Of course, head-
quarter location is only a rough proxy for firm location, since firms typically have operations
in multiple areas. To address this problem, I follow Garc´ıa and Norli (2012) and use state-
name counts from firms’ annual 10-K statements to measure the geographic scope of a firm’s
operations.8 Firm 10-K statements typically list information on the firm’s properties, such as
factories, warehouses, and sales offices. For example, a firm may include sales by the state
in which they are operating stores, or list their manufacturing facilities by location. Thus,
7See http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/econlist.cfm.
8Data for state-name counts was obtained from Diego Garc´ıa.
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state-name counts provide a reasonable proxy for the degree of firm localization. Firms that
do not mention any U.S. state names in their 10-K are excluded from the sample. Due to data
availability, state-name counts are only available for the 12-year period from 1996 to 2008.9
During this period, firms with non-zero state-name counts make up approximately 80% of
firms in the sample each year. This sub-sample is particularly important for my results, since
firms with operations in fewer states are probably more closely tied to their local economy,
and hence more effected by changes in local proprietary income growth.
The variable of primary interest is the demeaned annual per proprietor (non-farm) propri-
etary income growth rate, denoted hereafter as PINC. This variable is calculated as follows
Proprietary income growtha,t = log
(
Proprietary incomea,t
No. of proprietorsa,t
)
− log
(
Proprietary incomea,t−1
No. of proprietorsa,t−1
)
PINCa,t = Proprietary income growtha,t −
1
179
179∑
a=1
Proprietary income growtha,t
where a denotes geographic area–either EA or state, t denotes the year, and 1179
∑179
a=1 Proprietary
income growtha,t is the average proprietary income growth rate across all EAs in year t. De-
meaning adjusts for aggregate fluctuations in proprietary income, so that PINC is a purely
local measure of proprietary income variation.10 Proprietary income consists of the excess
revenue over explicit production cost of owner-operated businesses (e.g., sole proprietorships,
partnerships, and tax-exempt cooperatives), and is equal to slightly less than 10% of national
income. Data used to construct PINC as well as area population, employment, and wage
data are obtained from the BEA and begin in 1970.
Essentially, PINC is a proxy for the time-varying returns to entrepreneurship in an area—
that is, it is the average amount an individual can expect to earn by becoming a proprietor
9Some 10-K state-name counts are available for 1994 and 1995, however, the sample of firms for these years
is small averaging only 22% of stocks in the sample for those years. Consequently, these years are excluded
from this sub-sample.
10It is interesting to note that average proprietary income growth is also a weak predictor of stock re-
turns. High proprietary income growth predicts low future returns. This is consistent with Heaton and Lucas
(2000) which report that the aggregate proprietary income growth rate provides an important measure of
entrepreneurial risk which cross-sectionally helps to price stock returns.
9
at any given time. Many ways have been suggested to measure entrepreneurship—typical
measures include the number of proprietors or small businesses per area, however, these mea-
sures often follow, rather than lead, changes in proprietary income. For example, a high
number of proprietors in an area does not cause average proprietor income to rise nearly as
much as an increase in average proprietor income causes individuals to become entrepreneurs.
Glaeser, Rosenthal, and Strange (2009) state that the five facets of entrepreneurship are self-
employment, small firms, ownership, entry, and innovation. While the number of entrepreneurs
or the number of small firms captures the first four aspects of entrepreneurship, they fail to
capture the time-varying effects of entrepreneur innovation. I hypothesize that PINC is a sig-
nificantly better measure in this regard since it provides a direct measure of the profitability
of entrepreneurs in an area.
The distribution of proprietors by skill-level typically follows a U-shape pattern: the num-
ber of proprietors in an area is high for both less educated, low-income individuals and high-
income, well-educated individuals. One short-coming of BEA proprietary income data is that
it is not industry specific. Thus, identifying who the proprietors are that make up the sample
is difficult. For example, I can’t distinguish in the data whether income growth is driven by
hot-dog vendors or high-tech startups.11 However, I conjecture that any sizeable growth in
PINC will be driven primarily by innovations from high-value entrepreneurs. This conjecture
is consistent with my finding that PINC primarily predicts returns for firms in innovative,
high human-capital industries.
Since stock return anomalies often exist primarily in stocks with small market capitaliza-
tion, to minimize the effect of these firms on results, firms in the smallest quintile of market
capitalization at the beginning of each year are dropped from the sample. Newly listed firms
are also dropped by this filter since they have no market capitalization in the previous year. To
diminish the possibility of reverse causality—for example, a single firm that drives an area’s
11Using a variety of related datasets, Hurst and Pugsley (2011) find that over two-thirds of all small businesses
consists of primarily of skilled craftspeople (such as plumbers, electricians, contractors, and painters), skilled
professionals (such as lawyers, accountants, and architects), insurance and real estate agents, physicians, den-
tists, mechanics, beauticians, restaurateurs, and small shopkeepers (for example, gas station and grocery store
owners). Moreover, they find that most small businesses do not grow in size or innovate along any observable
margin, i.e. very few report spending resources on R&D, patenting, copyright or trademark protection.
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entire local economy including PINC—any areas containing firms consisting of more than
50% of the area market capitalization are dropped from the sample. Typically this filter drops
rural areas with only one or two firms from the sample. Including micro-caps and high area
market-share firms does not change my results, other than slightly inflating the size of the over-
all return predictability. To additionally reduce the effect of size, portfolios are value-weighted
by firms’ previous year market capitalization.
All annual variables are in real terms and are deflated using CPI data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. All growth rates and returns are in percentages. Additional data used
includes firm-specific patenting data from the NBER patent database for patents granted
between 1976 and 2006, annual and monthly Fama-French factor data obtained from Ken
French, and monthly DGTW returns for the years 1975-2009 obtained from Russ Wermers.12
DGTW benchmark portfolios prior to July 1975 are constructed by the author. Housing price
data and housing collateral data is obtained from Robert Shiller 13 and Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
14, while data from the Federal Reserve Board’s “Senior loan officer opinion survey on bank
lending practices” 15 is also used. CAY data is obtained from Martin Lettau16, and payout-
adjusted dividend yield data is obtained from Michael Roberts17.
Summary statistics for the majority of variables used are recorded in Table 1. This table
reports the mean and standard deviation for monthly excess and risk-adjusted stock returns;
annual stock returns, firm fundamental growth rates, and firm size; and EA-specific variables
such as population per EA, number of firms per EA, etc. Growth rates are demeaned annually.
EA growth rate averages deviate slightly from zero since the table summarizes only growth
rates for areas with a non-zero number of public firms, while demeaning uses information from
12The Fama-French factor data are available via http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.
french/data_library.html. The DGTW benchmarks are available via http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/
rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm
13http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm
14http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~svnieuwe/
15http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/201201/chartdata.htm
16http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lettau/data.html
17http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~mrrobert/data_code.htm
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all EAs.
Table 2 reports the probability of an EA transitioning from one PINC quintile this year to
another PINC quintile the following year. Interestingly, the probability distribution appears
to be flat. Moreover, the average PINC autocorrelation across EAs is 0.034. This lack of
persistence in PINC is due, somewhat, to increases in the number of proprietors following
growth in PINC, but, more importantly, to the nature of PINC’s variation. Namely, the
highly-stochastic nature of PINC is consistent with my hypothesis that changes to this variable
are driven primarily by innovations from high-value entrepreneurs.
3. PINC predicts returns and news about future cash flows
My primary empirical results show that growth in proprietary income per proprietor
(PINC) predicts firm stock returns and fundamental growth rates. For example, Figure 2
shows the value of a dollar invested in the beginning of 1972 in a value-weighted portfolio of
all firms in the sample that year (the market portfolio) and value-weighted portfolios consist-
ing of firms located in EAs in the top and bottom quintiles of PINC in the previous year.18
At the end of 2009, the strategy of investing in the high growth portfolio each year is worth
$9.71—almost twice the return on the market portfolio ($5.58) and roughly four times the
amount earned investing in firms located in low growth areas ($2.64).
In Section 3.1, I examine PINC’s ability to predict returns both cross-sectionally and
across time. First, I look at monthly risk-adjusted stock returns sorted by prior year PINC
quintile. Next, I examine PINC’s ability to predict returns though time by forming value-
weighted area portfolios consisting of all stocks in an EA and then running panel predictive
regressions of EA portfolio returns on lagged PINC. In both cases, I find that PINC is a
strong predictor of future returns. I also check for evidence of reversal or reverse causality, but
find none.
In addition to returns, Section 3.2 reports evidence that PINC predicts news about future
181971 is excluded as an outlier. The long-short annual return in this year was 80% and is due to extreme
returns and under-diversification of the high growth portfolio. In all other years there are more than 100 firms
in both the high- and low-growth portfolios.
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firm cash flows. I find that PINC predicts growth in firm investment, R&D, assets, earnings
and cash flows. As with returns, this predictability exists both in the cross-section and time
series. Finally, in Section 3.3, I examine PINC’s effect on its local economy, and report area
characteristics by average PINC quintile.
3.1. Risk-adjusted return predictability
Tables 3 and 4 present average risk-adjusted monthly stock returns for firms according to
the performance of proprietors where firms are headquartered in the previous year. Specifically,
each year, economic areas are ranked by PINC. Based on this ranking, firms are sorted into
quintiles. In Table 3, equal-weighted return averages are then taken across time and firms,
while in Table 4 value-weighted portfolios are formed by PINC quintile and Fama-French 4
factor regressions are run.
In the first column of Table 3, returns are market-adjusted by the value-weighted monthly
average of all returns in the sample. A quick inspection shows a strong monotonic pattern
between last year’s proprietary income growth rate and this year’s market-adjusted stock
returns. On average, firms headquartered in areas with the highest PINC quintile in the
previous year experience monthly market-adjusted returns which are 27 basis points bigger, or
3.24% annualized (t-statistic = 5.26), than firms headquartered in areas with the lowest quintile
of PINC. Similar patterns exist for industry-adjusted and DGTW-adjusted returns. Column
2 shows results for returns adjusted monthly by their corresponding value-weighted Fama-
French 49 industry portfolio return. The average difference between firms in high- and low-
growth areas is 17 basis points per month, or 2.04% annualized (t-statistic = 3.43). Column 3
adjusts returns by their characteristic-matched DGTW benchmark, i.e., a benchmark portfolio
matched to firm’s by their prior year size, book-to-market and momentum characteristics.19
Similar to the industry-adjusted return results, the average difference between firms in high-
and low- growth areas is 18 basis points per month, or 2.16% annualized (t-statistic = 3.63).
Table 4 reports Fama-French 4-factor regression results. Value-weighted portfolios are
19For more information on how DGTW benchmarks are constructed, see Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1997) and Wermers (2004)
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formed according to firms’ previous year PINC quintile and portfolio returns are regressed on
the three Fama-French (1993) factors: the excess return on the market portfolio, MKTRF; the
small-minus-big portfolio return, SMB; and the high-minus-low portfolio return, HML; and the
Carhart (1997) momentum factor, MOM.20 Each row in the table corresponds to a different
quintile portfolio. The last row reports regression results for a portfolio that is long firms in
the highest PINC quintile the previous year and short firms in the lowest PINC quintile.
Similar to Table 3 results, the long-short abnormal return (ALPHA) is 36 basis points per
month, or 4.32% annualized (t statistic = 2.64). This return is slightly larger than those found
in Table 3, due to an extreme outlier in 1971. Excluding returns in this year the long-short
abnormal return is 22 basis points (t statistic 1.83), or 2.64% annualized. Thus, it can be
concluded that the average risk-adjusted return difference for firms in high growth versus low
growth areas is a robust, statistically-significant 2% per year over the 39-year sample period.
Table 5 shows pooled panel regressions of excess area portfolio returns on lagged PINC
and other controls. Specifically, it reports results for the following regression
Ra,t −Rf,t = α+ βPINCa,t−1 + γWAGEa,t−1 + η ·Xt−1 + εa,t (1)
where Ra,t is the annual return on a value-weighted portfolio consisting of all firms in EA
a at year t, WAGEa,t−1 is the per employee wage growth rate by EA, and X is a vector
of known predictor variables: the aggregate payout-adjusted log dividend yield,21 CAY, the
term spread, and the default spread. Regression results are presented for a variety of standard
error estimation schemes. Additionally, to diminish the possibility of extreme portfolio returns
from under-diversified portfolios, area portfolios are required to have at least 20 firms in the
previous year to be included in the sample.
The first two columns of Table 5 include only PINC as a regressor. The coefficient in
this case is 0.52 for OLS regressions. The standard deviation of PINC for this sub-sample
20I also looked at five factor regressions including the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor. However this
variable was statistically insignificant in all regressions so I have excluded it.
21See Boudoukh et al. 2007
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is 5.36, hence, a one-standard deviation increase in an area’s PINC would imply a 2.79%
increase in average area returns next year. In the first column, White standard errors are
reported, and in second column standard errors are calculated clustering on both area and
year. In unreported results, I find that the standard errors clustered by area are only slightly
smaller than the White standard errors, and that the standard errors from double-clustering
are almost identical to the standard errors obtained by clustering on year. Essentially, this
implies that that area effects are small in this regression (e.g., return autocorrelation does not
seem to be much of a concern), while adjusting standard errors to correct for co-movement of
area portfolios within a year is paramount to obtaining correct standard error estimates.
In Column 3, WAGE is added as a regressor. Adding this variable increases the coefficient
on PINC by about 18%, which suggests that PINC is measuring more than simply fluctua-
tions in local business cycles. Similar to other area-level predictor variables (see Kumar and
Korniotis, 2012), WAGE predicts counter-cyclical return variation. Additional variables that
have been shown to predict aggregate market returns are added as regressors in Column 4,
although only the default spread is close to being statistically significant. In the last column,
I verify my estimates by estimating equation (1) using a Fama-MacBeth regression. Fama-
MacBeth regressions are designed to adjust for cross-sectional correlation within a panel. The
PINC coefficient estimate and associated t-statistic are near their OLS counterparts clus-
tered on area and year. However, the coefficient on WAGE is much smaller and subsequently
WAGE is no longer a statistically significant regressor.
One possible explanation for the observed predictability is that it is due to reverse causality.
For example, it could be the case that public firms and proprietors do well contemporaneously
and that subsequent return momentum generates the observed results. To test this, I sort
returns into quintiles each year and examine the average PINC by return quintile. Table 6
reports these results. Column 1 shows results sorting on the full sample of returns. Column
2 reports results sorting on only firms in the second quintile of market capitalization. This
column tests for the possibility that growth in proprietor income is correlated to factors that
drive small firm returns. Perhaps the most reasonable case for reverse causality is a dominant
area firm leading the entire local economy. Columns 3, 4, and 5 sort returns into quintiles
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using only firms in the largest market capitalization quintile, the largest market capitalization
decile, and the return of the firm with the largest market capitalization in each area. In none of
these sorts do I find any evidence that returns are contemporaneously correlated with PINC.
Additionally, in unreported results, I check to see if firm returns predict PINC: Firms are
sorted into quintiles by their current returns and averages are taken of their corresponding
PINC next year. Similar to results using contemporaneous returns and PINC, I find no
evidence of reverse causality.
Another possible explanation for the observed predictability is investor overreaction. If this
were the case then I would expect returns to reverse in the future as arbitrageurs correct asset
prices. Figure 3 shows a plot of the average cumulative returns of a value-weighted portfolio
that is long firms with high PINC in the sorting year and short firms in the lowest PINC
quintile. The plot shows cumulative raw returns (dashed line) and cumulative DGTW-adjusted
returns (solid-line) for 60 months before the sorting year, the 12 months during the sorting
year, and the 60 months after the sorting year. Since five years are required to construct
averages, the data used to construct this plot are from 1976 to 2004. Both during the sorting
year and in the 60 months before the sorting, there appears to be no run-up in cumulative
returns, consistent with the results of Table 6 which find no evidence of reverse causality. In
the first year following the sorting, average cumulative returns increase by approximately 3%.
Cumulative returns continue to rise over the following 48 months, and show no sign of reversing.
Thus, I conclude that there is little evidence for a story involving investor overreaction.
3.2. Cash flow predictability
To be consistent with a lack of reversal and pro-cyclical return predictability, I should also
find that PINC predicts firm fundamental growth rates. Table 7 reports average market-
adjusted firm fundamental growth rates by prior year PINC quintile. Growth rates are
calculated as log differences, hence negative earnings and cash flows are dropped.22 Column
22There are several reasons why firms have negative earnings. Typically these reasons can be classified as
temporary (e.g., a business cycle downturn), long term (e.g., a dying firm), or life-cycle related (e.g., young,
start-up companies that require large upfront investments). When earnings are negative, the log-difference
growth rate cannot be calculated. Other adjustments can be made to calculate growth rates using negative
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1 reports average investment growth rates by PINC quintiles, Column 2 R&D growth rates,
Column 3 asset growth rates, Column 4 earnings growth rates and Column 5 cash flow growth
rates. For each of these measures, growth rates are roughly 1% higher per year following high
PINC versus following low PINC in an area. In particular, PINC is cross-sectionally a very
strong predictor of firm investment and R&D growth rates.
Examining PINC’s ability to predict fundamental growth rates through time, value-
weighted growth rate averages are taken by area, ga,t, then the following pooled-panel re-
gressions are run for each fundamental growth rate:
ga,t = α+ βPINCa,t−1 + εa,t (2)
Standard errors are clustered on year and area, and regression results are reported in Table
8. As with Table 7 sorts, the results in Table 8 suggest that PINC is strongest predicting
growth in investment and R&D. However, some evidence also remains that PINC predicts
asset and cash flow growth rates.23 The standard deviation of PINC for this sample is 5.36.
Thus, a one-standard deviation increase PINC increases investment by 1.13%, R&D by 0.43%,
assets, 0.64%, and cash flows by 0.59%. Both cash flow and asset growth rates are statistically
significant at the 10% level, while investment and R&D growth rates are statistically significant
at the 5% level.
3.3. PINC as a measure of area vibrancy
How are areas where PINC is consistently high different from areas where PINC is
consistently low? Table 9 answers this question. In this table, firms are sorted according to
prior year PINC and annually-demeaned averages of area variables by PINC quintile are
reported. PINC is correlated with area population: areas with higher PINC on average,
have about 310,000 more people, on average, than those with low PINC. This difference is
earnings, however, the interpretation of these variables is difficult.
23Of course, fundamental predictability should be weaker than stock return predictability, as stock returns
are forward-looking while changes in firm profitability may occur soon after proprietary growth rate shocks, or
possibly much farther into the future.
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statistically significant at the 10% level, however this is not a huge difference given that the
average area population is roughly 2.3 million people. There is not a significant difference in
the average size of firms in high growth versus low growth areas. However, high growth areas,
on average, have about 1.09 more firms per capita than low growth areas. The difference in the
number of firms per capita is statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is interesting
since it says that either the birth-rate of new firms is higher, or the death-rate of firms is lower in
areas where PINC is consistently high versus areas where PINC is consistently low. Whether
this is caused by PINC or is also determined by other factors is unknown, and is left for future
investigation. However, this finding implies interesting possibilities for PINC as a proxy for
the time-varying health of an area. This is not surprising, though, given entrepreneurship’s
key role in generating urban success.
In addition to affecting nearby public firms, it is possible that PINC is also correlated
with changes in the local economy. That is, regardless of whether PINC is causing changes
in public firms or merely reacting faster to common shocks, it is informative to see whether
PINC also leads its local economy. Columns 4 through 6 look at the average proprietor growth
rate, employment growth rate, and per employee wage growth rate by prior year’s PINC,
respectively. PINC is a strong predictor of future proprietor, employment, and per employee
wage growth. Thus, when proprietor income in an area rises, the number of proprietors in
the following year increases, as do the number of employed workers and the average wage
per employee. Unfortunately, I cannot tell whether the increase in employees and wages is
driven by the successful proprietors hiring more individuals and paying them higher wages, or
whether this is simply an improvement similar to the one experienced by proprietors in the
previous year. Overall, it appears that, on average, areas with high levels of proprietor success
are economically more successful than areas with low PINC.
4. Conditional PINC predictability
In this section, I further examine the established predictive ability of PINC. Here, I hope
to better classify the shocks driving fluctuations in PINC and, subsequently, returns. I find
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that PINC is strongest when predicting changes in local firms, in firms in human-capital-
intensive industries, and following the weakening of proprietor financial constraints. I also try
to determine whether the observed predictability is due to proprietors’ abilities to respond
more quickly to industry shocks, but find little evidence for this story. Given my findings,
I conclude that the shocks driving PINC are local in nature and likely due to technology
shocks. I also find that the transmission of these shocks to public firms is deeply intertwined
with proprietors’ abilities to respond to fluctuations in PINC.
4.1. Predictability conditional on firm localization
If the observed predictability patterns are due to local factors, my results should be stronger
when limiting firms to only those with localized operations. Table 10 shows that this is,
indeed, the case. Similar to Garc´ıa and Norli (2012), I use state-name counts from firms’
annual 10-K statements as a proxy for the geographic scope of a firm’s operations. Panel
A of Table 10 reports the average monthly DGTW-adjusted return for firms by prior year
PINC quintile and degree of firm localization as determined by prior year state-name counts.
Because state-name counts are only available for a sub-sample of years, Column 1 of this
table reports average returns for the full sub-sample period (1996 - 2008) for which state-name
count data is available. Similar to results calculated using the full sample, I find that PINC
leads returns, however, over this time period, the correlation between PINC and returns is
much stronger and generates a risk-adjusted return difference of 64 basis points per month, or
7.68% annualized (t-statistic = 6.13), between firms in high- and low-growth areas. Columns
2 through 5 report the same results as Column 1 limiting the sample to only firms that have
operations in one state (Column 2), only firms that have operations in five or fewer states
(Column 3), only firms that have operations six to ten states (Column 4), and only firms with
operations in more then ten states (Column 5). Consistent with my hypothesis that truly local
firms will be more affected by proprietary income shocks, I find that the relationship between
growth and returns is stronger for more-localized firms with a very strong monotonic pattern
for firms located in the highest PINC quintile in the previous year. The average DGTW-
adjusted return decreases monotonically from 91 basis points for firms with operations in only
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one state to four basis points for firms with operations in more than ten states.
Since returns are DGTW-adjusted, the fact that localized firms are likely also smaller firms
does not imply that these results are being driven by a “small firm” effect—i.e., these results
are not due to simply sorting on firm size. However, it is informative to further sort the sample
on firm size, to see if PINC affects small firms disproportionately more than large firms. In
unreported results, I sort firms into size quintiles and then look at firms in the smallest size
quintile with operations in five or fewer states. The average return difference for small firms
located in high- versus low-growth areas is 1.18% per month, or about double the difference
for firms in the largest size quintile, in which case the difference is about 66 basis points per
month. Interesting, though, is the asymmetric response of big and small firms to high and low
proprietary income growth. Big firms are much more negatively affected by low PINC than
small firms, while small firms tend to benefit much more from high PINC than big firms.
My hypothesis is that high PINC is an indicator for future growth opportunities which small
firms can capitalize on while large firms, which are largely set in their ways, cannot.
4.2. Predictability conditional on industry human-capital intensity
To further understand the shocks driving changes in proprietary income growth and returns,
I examine PINC’s ability to predict returns conditional on firm’s industry human-capital
intensity, as defined by their Fama-French 49 industry classification. To measure industry
human-capital intensity, I calculate value-weighted averages by industry for the number of
patents per firm (log(1 + Number patents per firm)), the average Selling, General and Admin-
istrative Expenses (SG&A) per employee per firm (log(1 + SG&A/Employees)), where SG&A
is used as a proxy for firm wages, and the average R&D per firm (log(1+R&D)). The idea be-
ing that firms in high human-capital industries produce more innovations, earn higher wages,
and conduct more research. Industry average patenting is 36% correlated with both industry
average wages per employee and industry average R&D, while industry average R&D and wage
per employee are 66% correlated.
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Table 11 reports regression results for the following equation:
Ri,I,t−Rf,t = α+βPINCa,t−1+ζPINCa,t−1×Human CapitalI,t−1+γHuman CapitalI,t−1+εa,t
(3)
where Ri,I,t is the return of firm i in industry I at time t, Human CapitalI,t−1 is one of the
above mentioned industry human-capital-intensity proxies. Standard errors are clustered on
year and firm. To diminish the effect of outliers, I require that there be at least five firms per
industry within an area in the previous year to be included in the sample.
I am primarily interested in the interaction between industry human-capital intensity and
PINC. I find that this interaction is statistically significant at the 5% level for industry
average patents and industry average wages, and statistically significant at the 10% for industry
average R&D. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in industry patenting (standard
deviation = 0.51) increases the coefficient on PINC to 0.58, which is similar to the PINC
coefficient found in Table 5. Overall, these results imply that the predictive capability of
PINC resides mainly in its ability to predict the returns of firms in high human-capital,
i.e., high technology industries. While certainly not conclusive evidence, these findings are
consistent with PINC’s predictive abilities being connected with knowledge spillovers. I run
similar regressions for cash flow growth, but find no statistically significant interactions, so
results are not reported.
Due to PINC’s strong interaction with industry-related factors, I hypothesize that its
predictive ability may be due to proprietors responding faster than public firms to common
industry shocks. This could be the case if both the local public and private sectors shared
a common industry concentration–something which is likely for areas with strong industry
agglomerations, such as Silicon Valley or Detroit. To examine this possibility, I run time-
series regressions of value-weighted annual area portfolio returns on the lagged PINC from an
area with a similar industry concentration. If PINC and returns are being driven by shared
industry shocks, then the PINC from another area with similar industry-concentrations should
also be able to predict area returns.
To construct area matches, I must first determine industry concentration. One shortcoming
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of proprietary income data is that I cannot separate proprietors by industries. Thus, to
determine an area’s dominant industry, I must rely solely on measures constructed from public
firm data. I define an industry as dominant if it has the largest industry market share within
a given area, and an area as having a dominate industry if, for more than 40% of the years
it is in the sample, it has the same dominant industry. For example, I find that from 1970 to
2009 the oil industry has had the largest industry market share for Houston 39 out of its 39
years in the sample. Thus, I define Houston’s dominant industry as oil.
Using these area-industry classifications, I match areas to those with a similar dominant
industry. If an area has more than one matched area with the same dominant industry,
then the matched-area with the the highest percentage of dominance is considered that area’s
“Matched PINC.” For example, New York City, Atlanta, and Washington D.C. are each
considered dominant in the business services industry (Fama-French industry classification
#34). When looking for an area-industry matched pair for Washington, D.C., both New York
City and Atlanta will work. New York City is chosen because it is dominated by business
services 85% of the time while Washington, D.C. is dominated by business services only 50%
of the time.
Table 12 reports regression results for this test. To be included in the sample, I require
each area to have at least 20 years of observations with at least 20 firms in the previous year,
and to have a matched area/industry. The 20 firm requirement is to ensure that portfolios
are reasonably well diversified, and the 20 years requirement is so I have enough data to run
time-series regressions. These filters decrease the sample to 13 economic areas. Each row of
Table 12 represents regressions for a different economic area. Since the table is somewhat
complex, I begin by explaining the results for a single area Atlanta (EA 11) in the first row.
The first column reports the economic area of interest, and the second and third columns its
dominant industry with the corresponding percentage of years this industry dominates. For
example, Atlanta’s dominant industry is Business Services which is dominant 59% of the 37
years Atlanta is in the sample. The fourth column reports the area’s matched industry-area
pair. For Atlanta this match is EA 118–New York City.
Column 5 of Table 12 reports results for time-series regressions of area portfolio annual
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returns on lagged PINC. For example, in the first row, results are reported for a regression of
Atlanta portfolio returns on Atlanta’s PINC from the previous year and a constant. There are
37 observations in this regression and the coefficient on PINC is a statistically insignificant
-0.35. It is interesting to note the areas for which PINC is a strong predictor of area returns:
Overall, PINC is statistically significant at the 10% level or better in 5 of the 13 areas in the
sample. As expected from the results in Table 11, the majority of the predictability comes
from areas where the dominant industry is human-capital intensive (e.g. Phoenix, Portland,
and San Jose). Detroit interestingly has a negative correlation with PINC, suggesting that
the performance of public firms is being crowded out by the entrepreneurial sector following a
rise in entrepreneur incentives.
In the final column I report results for time-series regressions of area portfolio annual
returns on the lagged matched area PINC. If common industry shocks are driving the corre-
lations between current PINC and future returns, then Matched PINC may also be able to
predict future area returns. In examining these regressions, I find no evidence that this is the
case, as none of the matched PINC coefficients are statistically significant. Combining these
results with those conditioning on firm localization, I conclude that whatever is driving the
correlations between PINC and returns is most likely not aggregate-market or industry-level
shocks, but rather shocks originating within the local area.
4.3. Predictability conditional on financial constraints
Financial constraints are a key concern to proprietors. Moreover, since proprietary busi-
ness’s are often small, proprietors often use their homes as loan collateral to obtain financing
for future investments.24 This makes housing prices an important component of their invest-
ment decisions. If proprietors are the channel through which proprietary income growth shocks
are propagated to public firms, then the magnitude of their effect on public firms and subse-
quently the degree of predictability, should increase when housing prices are on the rise. To
24For example, small business’ owners often finance operations with a second mortgage on their home (also
known as a home equity loan). This is especially true when proprietors have trouble getting traditional small
business loans. Housing can also be used as collateral in a small business loans.
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test this hypothesis, I examine PINC’s predictive ability conditional on whether aggregate
housing prices or housing collateral were rising during the PINC sorting year.
I use two proxies to measure changes in aggregate housing collateral: The first is the
growth rate (log difference) of the ratio of collateralizable housing wealth to non-collateralizable
human wealth (from Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh 2005), where the housing collateral stock
is measured by the market value of residential real estate wealth.25 I call this variable housing
collateral growth. Since this time series only goes to 2002, I also use the growth rate (log
difference) of the annual real home price index for the U.S. The housing collateral growth rate
and housing price growth rate are 59% correlated, and sorting on either rate produces very
similar results.
Panel A of Figure 4 plots the yearly difference in the value-weighted portfolio return of all
firms located in the highest PINC quintile areas in the previous year minus the value-weighted
portfolio return of all firms in the lowest PINC quintile.26 On top of this is also graphed the
time-series of U.S. home price growth lagged one year, and the housing collateral growth rate
time-series lagged one year. From this plot, it is simple to see the strong correlation between
both housing collateral and housing price growth rates. Additionally, a cursory inspection
reveals the negative correlation between housing collateral and price growth rates and the
long-short PINC quintile portfolio. Panel B plots a similar figure, except that in years when
the lagged housing price rate is less then zero, it plots the difference between low growth
quintile portfolio minus the high growth quintile portfolio. Doing this decreases the number of
years in the sample with negative returns less than -5% from six to three, with a substantial
improvement in the latter half of the sample. This is somewhat surprising given that Lustig and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) find that higher housing collateral growth unconditionally implies
negative aggregate returns. Thus, it is the interaction of housing price changes with proprietor
income growth that causes the changes in firm returns and not the changes in housing prices
25Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005)also use the value of outstanding home mortgages and the net stock
current cost value of owner-occupied and tenant-occupied residential fixed assets as measures of aggregate
housing collateral stock. Using these alternative measures to calculate housing collateral growth yields very
similar results to using the market value of residential real estate wealth.
26The figure starts in 1972 in order to drop an extreme positive outlier in 1971.
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alone.
To formalize these visual observations, Table 13 reports DGTW-adjusted monthly returns
for firms sorted according to their prior year’s PINC, conditional on whether housing collateral
or prices rose or fell over the prior year. The first column shows that, conditional on aggregate
housing prices rising during the sorting year, the average DGTW-adjusted return for firms
located in areas with high proprietary income growth in the prior year is 40 basis points (4.8%
annualized) over the average DGTW-adjusted return for firms located in areas in the lowest
quintile of proprietary income growth in the prior year. This value is statistically significant
at the 1% level. Interestingly, this pattern reverses when housing prices are decreasing and
financial constraints are tightening during the sorting year. In this instance, the average
difference between firms in high and low growth areas is -15 basis points (-1.8% annualized).
Thus, conditioning on weakening financial constraints for proprietors more than doubles the
magnitude of the predictability.
To verify the results using housing price growth rates, I also report results sorting on
housing collateral growth rates and mortgage loan survey data. Columns 3 and 4 find similar
results sorting on growth in aggregate housing collateral: in years following housing collateral
increases, the long-short return is 42 basis points, and in years following house price decreases,
the long-short portfolio is -24 basis points.
One peculiarity is the negative correlation between PINC and returns conditional on
falling housing prices. A possible explanation for this is that housing collateral growth is also
a proxy for aggregate business cycles. In this sense, if the aggregate economy is in a recession
and local proprietors are doing well, the incentives to become proprietors may be stronger than
otherwise. Subsequently high proprietor growth during downturns substantially hurts public
firms as talented workers leave wage work for self-employment.
In sum, these results do not necessarily imply that local proprietors are causally effecting
neighboring public firms. However, given that the return predictability is only positive when
housing prices are also rising, i.e. only when proprietor financial constraints are weakening,
does suggest that even if proprietors are not the immediate cause for firm stock prices changing,
they still play an important role in how these shocks are propagated to public firms. That is,
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it is not merely the increase in proprietor income that leads to higher firm returns, but the
local economy’s response after that shock that determines how firms internalize the success of
proprietors.
5. Aggregate market return predictability
In the previous section, I showed that PINC’s predictive ability was strongest for firms
with localized business operations and for firms in human-capital-intensive industries. Addi-
tionally, I showed that the state of individuals’ financial constraints had a way of magnifying
or diminishing the effect of these shocks within the local economy and, ultimately, to public
firms.
Given this evidence, it appears that growth in local proprietary income is most likely gen-
erated by a technology or productivity shock for three main reasons: First, similar to other
measures of technology shocks (such as aggregate patenting or R&D) and unlike typical mea-
sures of business conditions (such as CAY or the dividend yield), local proprietary income
growth predicts pro-cyclical stock returns, i.e., high local proprietary income growth is fol-
lowed by higher returns, and low growth by low returns. Second, return predictability due to
proprietary income growth rates is concentrated primarily in high-human-capital industries,
where innovations are paramount and technologies are constantly changing. Finally, growth in
local proprietary income predicts growth in the future investment, R&D, earnings, and cash
flows for firms headquartered locally, consistent with PINC being correlated with predicable
variation in news about future cash-flows.
Typically cash flow news does not matter for return predictability because it is highly id-
iosyncratic and subsequently, diversifies away in large enough portfolios (Vuolteenaho, 2002).
However, it is simple enough to think of systematic cash-flow news: for example, a new tech-
nology within an industry agglomeration. In the case of the above predictability patterns,
it appears that PINC is predicting news about local cash flows that is non-diversifiable in
local portfolios. I hypothesize that, since these cash flow shocks do not diversify out in local
portfolios, some of these shocks will not diversify out in aggregate portfolios either.
To test this hypothesis, I perform factor analysis across the PINC time series for all
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EAs, and test for a common factor that prices returns across all areas and subsequently the
aggregate stock market. Doing precisely this, I find such a factor. This factor explains roughly
54% of the variation across all PINC time series. Column 1 of Table 14 reports the results
for a regression of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio excess return on a one-year lag
of this factor. The coefficient on the lagged factor is 6.89 (t-statistic = 2.98), which, since
the factor has a standard deviation of 1 by construction, implies an increase in the aggregate
market return of 6.89% following a one-standard-deviation increase in this factor.
Unfortunately, this factor is subject to a significant look-ahead bias since it is constructed
using areas’ entire PINC time series. This problem can be side-stepped, however, due to
the remarkable fact that this factor is 81% correlated with the PINC from EA 146: the San
Jose-San Francisco-Oakland economic area, i.e., the Silicon Valley. reports regression results
of area portfolio returns on lagged PINC 146. The next four columns in Table 14 and Figure
5 investigate PINC 146’s ability to predict the aggregate market premium.
Figure 5 plots the market portfolio excess return time-series and the PINC 146 time-series
lagged one year with diamond-markers indicating years in which the lagged U.S. home price
growth rate is greater than zero, and squares indicating years when this rate is less then zero.
From this figure it is easy to see the exceptionally high correlation between PINC 146 and
future returns in years following rising housing prices.
Columns 2 through 5 of Table 14 formalize the visual evidence of Figure 5 and report
time-series regressions for the following equation
Rm,t−Rf,t = α+βPINC 146t−1+ηCAYt−1+ζD/Pt−1+γTerm spread+δDefault spread+εt
(4)
where Rm,t−Rf,t is CRSP value-weighted annual market portfolio excess return, PINC 146 is
the PINC from EA 146, D/P is the payout adjusted log dividend-yield, i.e. the dividend yield
adjusted for aggregate net equity issuance (See Boudoukh et al.),27 CAY is the consumption
wealth ratio, Default spread is the monthly difference in a Baa versus a Aaa corporate bond
27The regular log dividend-yield was also tested as a regressor, however adjusting this variable for aggregate
net equity issuance yields much stronger predictability at the one-year-horizon.
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yield averaged each year, and Term spread is the annual difference in a long-horizon T-bond
rate (10 year bond) minus the three month T-bill rate. For this table all predictor variables are
standardized to have zero mean and unit variance to aid in regression coefficient comparisons.
Columns 2 and 3 report results for the full sample, and columns 4 and 5 report the same
results conditional on lagged housing price growth being positive. Columns 2 and 4 report
results for a regression of the market portfolio excess return on lagged PINC 146. The
estimated PINC 146 coefficient using the full sample is 6.03 (t-statistic = 2.23). This figure
increases to 8.19 (t-statistic = 4.31) in column 4, as the sample is limited to only years in which
home prices were rising. Columns 3 and 5 add the following additional variables as regressors:
the dividend yield, CAY, the default spread, and the term spread. Despite the addition of these
known return predictors, PINC 146 remains a statistically significant predictor, with PINC
146 being unimpeachably the strongest predictor of aggregate market returns conditional on
weakening proprietor financial constraints.
Finally, the last column of these tables reports regression results for HML on lagged PINC
146. The book-to-market ratio of a firm is often viewed as a measure of the ratio of its future
growth options to assets currently in place. Since HML could be measuring economy-wide
growth prospects one possibility is that PINC 146 may help to explain HML. However, as
Column 6 reports, this does not appear to be the case: lagged PINC 146 is unrelated to future
values of HML, or stated another way, PINC contains information about future growth options
unique to that contained by HML.
6. Conclusion
Technological progress is the backbone of economic growth. But where does it come from?
Is it the corporate lab or the private garage? Entrepreneurs are defined as risk-takers and
innovators who create jobs, wealth, and knowledge—but who are they?
Recent empirical research has cast doubts on the interpretation of small businesses as “en-
trepreneurs.” For example, Hurst and Pugsley (2012) find that most small businesses don’t
innovate, grow, or even want to grow. Thus, empirical works using the number of small busi-
nesses or self-employed as a proxy for the level of entrepreneurship fail to accurately measure
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true entrepreneurial levels. Using proprietary income growth remedies these problems by di-
rectly measuring the time-varying returns to entrepreneurship. Thus, while most proprietors
don’t innovate, my results suggest that some do—and that these innovations have a significant
impact on their surrounding economy.
This paper has shown two main facts. First, I have shown that local per proprietor pro-
prietary income growth rates predict the stock returns and future firm fundamentals of local
firms. This predictability is strongest for firms with limited geographic scope and is inde-
pendent of local business cycles, aggregate industry shocks, and aggregate proprietary income
shocks suggesting that the driving forces behind proprietary income shocks originate locally.
Moreover, the observed predictability is strongest for firms located in high technology ag-
glomerations. While I cannot tell who proprietors are in my sample, e.g., whether or not the
small businesses within these agglomerations are also high technology businesses, this result
is telling. If there are small businesses that innovate, this is precisely where we would expect
them to be located. Finally, this local predictability is deeply intertwined with proprietors’
access to financing. This alone makes a strong case for proprietors as the driving force behind
the observed predictability.
Second, I have shown that the Silicon Valley proprietary income growth rate predicts ag-
gregate stock market returns. This variable lacks many of the problems of other predictor
variables. Proprietary income growth is not persistent (unlike the dividend yield), is econom-
ically motivated, and is a macroeconomic variable rather than a financial one. Additionally,
assuming proprietary income growth is driven by technological innovation, this aggregate pre-
dictability occurs exactly where we would expect it to be—namely, the most innovative area
of the U.S. economy.
The simplest story seems to be that entrepreneurs innovate and these innovations lead to
future economic growth. However, other stories do exist which I am unable to entirely dismiss
given current results. For example, one possible alternative is that public firms make infras-
tructure investments in the anticipation of future growth. Assuming this investment is in the
form of hiring local law or construction firms, etc., then proprietary income growth would lead
future firm growth. However, this story has its own problems. For example, why would this
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story only apply to high technology firms and not, say, manufacturing agglomerations as well?
Additionally, how many firms would need to simultaneously invest in order to substantially
increase a region’s proprietary income? And finally, why would Silicon Valley proprietary
income growth predict nation-wide returns?
In sum, my findings show that the performance of small private firms predicts the per-
formance of larger public firms located nearby, and that growth in Silicon Valley proprietary
income leads the aggregate stock market. However, the reason for these facts continues to
be unclear. If these results are due to the powerful effect of a small minority of innovative
entrepreneurs, then there should be more evidence of their innovations—for example, if these
individuals are generating new ideas, perhaps there may be a patent trail. Consequently, future
research demands finding a direct link between proprietors and their innovations.
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Figure 2: Value of a dollar invested in proprietary income growth portfolio. This figure
shows the cumulative value of one dollar invested in stock portfolios formed according to the previous
year’s quintile of per capita proprietary income growth where firms are headquartered. Specifically, at
the beginning of each year, I rank areas according to their per proprietor proprietary income growth
rate (PINC) over the previous year. I then form stock portfolios, according to the growth rate quintile
where firms are headquartered. This figure shows the cumulative return on a dollar invested at the
beginning of 1972 in the portfolio of firms in the highest growth quintile (top line), the lowest growth
quintile (bottom dashed line), and the portfolio of all stocks in the sample (middle line).
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Figure 3: Average cumulative return differences. This figure shows the average cumulative
monthly return of a value-weighted portfolio that is long firms with high PINC in the sorting year
and short firms in the lowest PINC quintile. Both cumulative monthly raw returns (dashed line) and
cumulative monthly DGTW-adjusted returns (solid-line) for 60 months before the sorting year, the
12 months during the sorting year, and then 60 months after the sorting year. The sorting year is
indicated by dashed-red vertical lines. Since five years are required to construct averages, the data used
to construct this plot are from 1976 to 2004.
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Panel B: Long-short annual returns conditioning on positive housing price growth
-35
-25
-15
-5
5
15
25
35
1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008
Year
A
n
n
u
a
l r
e
tu
rn
Long - short return
 
Figure 4: Average returns for firms located in high versus low PINC areas by year. Panel
A of this figure plots the yearly difference in the value-weighted portfolio return of all firms located in
the highest PINC quintile areas in the previous year minus the value-weighted portfolio return of all
firms in the lowest PINC quintile. On top of this is graphed the U.S. home price growth rate lagged
one year, and the housing collateral growth rate lagged one year. Panel B plots a similar figure, only
in this instance, in years when the lagged housing price rate is less then zero, it plots the difference
between low growth quintile portfolio minus the high growth quintile portfolio.
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Figure 5: Annual market premium versus PINC 146 time-series lagged one year. This figure
illustrates the correlation between the market portfolio and lagged PINC 146. The red line indicates
the annual excess return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio, while the blue line reports the
annual Silicon Valley proprietary income growth rate (PINC 146) lagged one year. Diamonds indicate
years in which the lagged U.S. home price growth rate is greater than zero, while squares indicate years
when this rate is less then zero.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
This table reports the mean and standard deviation for monthly excess, DGTW-adjusted, industry
adjusted, and market adjusted stock returns. The same statistics are also reported for annual excess
returns, various firm fundamental growth rates, and firm size; and area-specific variables such as pop-
ulation per EA, number of firms per EA, and EA-level population, employee, proprietor, wage, and
per proprietor proprietary income growth rates. Growth rates are calculated as log differences, e.g.,
the growth rate of X is log(1 + Xt) − log(1 + Xt−1). Additionally, all growth rates and area-specific
variables are demeaned annually. EA area growth rate averages deviate slightly from zero since the
table summarizes only growth rates for areas with a non-zero number of public firms, while demeaning
uses information from all EAs. Both excess returns and all growth rates are in percentages. Population
is in millions of people.
N Mean SD
Monthly stock returns
Ri −Rf 1102730 0.56 17.17
Ri −RDGTW 987471 −0.05 15.11
Ri −RIND 1102730 0.02 15.42
Ri −RMKT 1102730 0.02 15.90
Annual firm stock returns, growth rates, and market capitalization
Ri −Rf 93387 5.41 54.68
Investment growth rate 91907 0.00 47.53
R&D growth rate 53642 0.00 22.89
Asset growth rate 93281 0.00 27.25
Earnings growth rate 60173 0.00 51.59
Cash flow growth rate 60026 0.00 30.66
Market capitalization (Millions) 93178 983.36 2790.91
Annual Economic Area variables and growth rates
Population (Millions) 3777 2.31 3.06
Number of firms per ea 3777 24.73 51.5
Population growth rate 3777 0.11 1.23
Employee growth rate 3777 0.04 1.83
Proprietor growth rate 3777 0.19 3.06
Per employee wage growth rate 3777 0.03 1.25
Per proprietor proprietary income growth rate (PINC) 3777 0.18 5.97
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Table 2: Transition probabilities
This table reports the observed transition probabilities of an area moving from PINC quintile i this
year to PINC quintile j next year.
(i, j) 1 2 3 4 5
1 23 21 18 18 20
2 20 20 23 21 17
3 17 21 22 22 18
4 19 20 20 22 19
5 22 18 18 19 24
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Table 3: Risk-adjusted monthly return averages
This table presents average risk-adjusted monthly returns for public firms based on the performance of
proprietors where they are headquartered in the previous year. Specifically, each year economic areas
are ranked by their per proprietor proprietary income growth rate, PINC. Based on this ranking,
firms are sorted into quintiles. Equal-weighted return averages are then taken across time and firms.
In the first column, returns are market-adjusted by the value-weighted monthly average of all returns
in the sample (Ri −RMKT ). Column two reports similar results for returns adjusted monthly by their
corresponding value-weighted Fama-French 49 industry portfolio return (Ri − RIND). Column three
adjusts returns by their characteristic-matched DGTW benchmark portfolio return (Ri − RDGTW ).
t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and are calculated using White standard errors. One, two, and
three asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
PINC quintile Ri −RMKT Ri −RIND Ri −RDGTW
Low −0.11∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.10∗∗
(−2.71) (−2.25) (−2.54)
2 −0.07∗∗ −0.03 −0.12∗∗∗
(−2.09) (−0.77) (−3.28)
3 −0.01 0.00 −0.04
(−0.39) (0.15) (−1.28)
4 −0.01 −0.00 −0.10∗∗∗
(−0.25) (−0.10) (−3.21)
High 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(5.05) (2.69) (2.64)
High−Low 0.27∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(5.26) (3.43) (3.63)
Observations 1102730 1102730 987471
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Table 4: Monthly PINC quintile portfolio returns on Fama-French factors
This table reports Fama-French 4-factor regression results. Value-weighted portfolios are formed accord-
ing to firms’ previous year PINC quintiles and portfolio returns are regressed on the three Fama-French
(1993) factors (the excess return on the market portfolio, MKTRF; the small-minus-big portfolio return,
SMB; and the high-minus-low portfolio return, HML), the momentum factor, MOM (Carhart 1997),
and a constant (ALPHA). Each row in the table corresponds to a different quintile portfolio. The
last row reports regression results for a portfolio that is long firms in the highest PINC quintile the
previous year and short firms in the lowest PINC quintile. For both panels, t-statistics are reported
in parentheses, and are calculated using White standard errors. One, two, and three asterisks denotes
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PINC quintile ALPHA MKTRF SMB HML MOM Obs. R2
Low −0.15∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.02 −0.18∗∗∗ 468 0.94
(−1.74) (51.80) (28.83) (0.56) (−6.59)
2 −0.09 1.07∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.14∗∗∗ 468 0.95
(−1.25) (60.84) (23.66) (1.51) (−4.72)
3 0.09 1.06∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.00 −0.23∗∗∗ 468 0.95
(1.20) (53.11) (17.81) (0.11) (−8.40)
4 0.01 1.03∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.14∗∗∗ 468 0.95
(0.19) (49.91) (21.54) (1.64) (−4.73)
High 0.21∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ 468 0.85
(1.76) (33.23) (9.99) (2.35) (−3.45)
High−Low 0.36∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.13∗ 0.11∗ 0.06 468 0.04
(2.64) (1.33) (−1.89) (1.88) (1.30)
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Table 5: Area portfolio return predictability regressions
This table reports pooled panel regressions of annual area portfolio excess returns on lagged PINC
and other controls. Specifically, it reports results for the following regression: Ra,t − Rf,t = α +
βPINCa,t−1 + γWAGEa,t−1 + η · Xt−1 + εa,t, where Ra,t − Rf,t is the annual excess return on a
value-weighted portfolio consisting of all firms in EA a at year t, WAGEa,t−1 is the per employee wage
growth rate by EA, and X is a vector of known predictor variables: the aggregate dividend yield, CAY,
the term spread, and the default spread. Regression results are presented estimating standard errors
using White standard errors (Column 1) and double-clustering on year and EA (Columns 2-5). In the
final column the regression equation is estimated using Fama-MacBeth. Area portfolios are required
to have at least 20 firms in the previous year to be included in the sample. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. One, two, and three asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ra −Rf Ra −Rf Ra −Rf Ra −Rf Ra −Rf
PINC 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.39∗
(3.46) (2.29) (2.83) (3.11) (1.95)
WAGE −3.62∗∗ −3.53∗∗ −0.69
(−2.09) (−2.00) (−1.10)
Dividend yield −0.02
(−0.11)
CAY 2.05
(1.11)
Term spread 0.02
(0.66)
Default spread 0.15∗
(1.72)
Constant 5.70∗∗∗ 5.70∗ 6.51∗∗ −16.97 6.07∗
(7.29) (1.76) (1.97) (−0.39) (1.79)
Std. Errors White Area & Year Area & Year Area & Year Fama-MacBeth
Observations 903 903 903 903 903
R2 0.014 0.014 0.058 0.139 0.211
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Table 6: Average PINC sorted by return quintile
This table examines the possibility that stock returns are contemporaneously related to changes in
PINC. Each year firms are sorted into quintiles according to their annual stock return and the average
contemporaneous PINC calculated across time and firms is reported by return quintile. Column 1
shows results sorting on the full sample of returns. Column 2 reports results sorting on only firms
in the second quintile of market capitalization, i.e. the bottom 20% of firms by market capitalization
each year. Columns 3, 4, and 5 sort returns into quintiles using only firms in the largest market
capitalization quintile, the largest market capitalization decile, and the return of the firm with the
largest market capitalization in each area. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, and are calculated
using White standard errors. One, two, and three asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Bottom 20% Top 20% Top 10% Largest Firm
Ri quintile PINC PINC PINC PINC PINC
Low −0.03 −0.00 −0.07 −0.02 −0.50∗∗
(−0.63) (−0.03) (−0.91) (−0.19) (−2.20)
2 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.24∗∗ −0.22
(0.94) (0.79) (1.47) (2.19) (−1.10)
3 −0.01 −0.13 −0.01 0.09 −0.33
(−0.16) (−1.58) (−0.12) (0.79) (−1.53)
4 −0.04 0.00 −0.05 0.04 −0.38∗
(−1.08) (0.02) (−0.67) (0.34) (−1.75)
High 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.05 −0.45∗
(0.96) (1.08) (0.69) (0.44) (−1.83)
High−Low 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.05
(1.13) (0.77) (1.12) (0.45) (0.16)
Observations 93387 23396 23448 11761 3777
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Table 7: Market-adjusted annual firm growth rate averages
This table reports average market-adjusted firm fundamental growth rates by prior year PINC quintile.
Growth rates are calculated as log differences. Column 1 reports average investment growth rates by
PINC quintiles, column 2 R&D growth rates, column 3 asset growth rates, column 4 earnings growth
rates and column 5 cash flow growth rates. t-statistic are reported in parentheses, and are calculated
using White standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PINC quintile Inv. growth R&D growth Asset growth Earnings growth CF growth
Low −0.57 −0.85∗∗∗ −0.49∗∗ −0.24 −0.18
(−1.42) (−3.45) (−2.16) (−0.44) (−0.54)
2 0.01 0.44∗ 0.58∗∗∗ −1.22∗∗ −0.69∗∗
(0.02) (1.92) (2.79) (−2.52) (−2.42)
3 −1.17∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.70∗∗∗ −0.14 −0.26
(−3.44) (0.04) (−3.64) (−0.31) (−0.97)
4 0.70∗∗ −0.08 0.46∗∗ 0.22 0.10
(2.09) (−0.39) (2.40) (0.49) (0.38)
High 0.84∗∗ 0.30 0.07 1.14∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(2.49) (1.41) (0.36) (2.51) (3.19)
High−Low 1.41∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 0.56∗ 1.38∗ 1.04∗∗
2.70 3.53 1.88 1.92 2.45
Observations 91171 53545 92528 59488 59342
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Table 8: Average area growth rate predictability regressions
This table reports pooled panel regressions of annual value-weighted area growth rate averages, ga,t,
on lagged PINC as follows ga,t = α+ βPINCa,t−1 + εa,t. In column 1, the dependent variable is the
average area investment growth rate. The dependent variable in the remaining columns is the average
area R&D growth rate, the average area asset growth rate, the average area earnings growth rate, and
the average area cash flow growth rate, respectively. Standard errors are double-clustered on year and
area. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. For both panels, one, two, and three asterisks denotes
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inv. growth R&D growth Asset growth Earnings growth CF growth
PINC 0.21∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.12∗ 0.02 0.11∗
(2.40) (2.35) (1.87) (0.14) (1.71)
Constant 3.54∗∗ 4.28∗∗∗ 7.04∗∗∗ 6.08∗∗∗ 8.04∗∗∗
(2.54) (8.07) (8.41) (4.04) (7.54)
Observations 903 903 903 903 903
R2 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.004
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Table 9: Average annual area statistics sorted by prior year PINC quintile
This table reports annual area variable averages by prior year PINC quintile. Column 1 reports average
population by PINC quintile. Similarly, Columns 2 and 3 report the average value-weighted average
market capitalization per area and the number of public firms per capita per area. Columns 4 through
6 report the average area proprietor growth rate, employment growth rate, and per employee wage
growth rate by prior year’s PINC. All area variables are demeaned annually. t-statistic are reported
in parentheses, and are calculated using White standard errors. One, two, and three asterisks denotes
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PINC quintile Pop. Mkt. cap. # firms Prop. gr. Emp. gr. Wage gr.
Low −0.18 −2.38 −0.40∗∗ −0.06 −0.22∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗
(−1.60) (−0.08) (−2.01) (−0.47) (−2.88) (−3.09)
2 −0.09 −43.95∗ −0.25 −0.12 −0.12∗∗ −0.08∗
(−0.79) (−1.89) (−1.38) (−1.06) (−2.03) (−1.86)
3 −0.00 0.77 −0.02 −0.06 −0.02 0.01
(−0.03) (0.03) (−0.13) (−0.59) (−0.40) (0.28)
4 0.13 34.87 −0.00 −0.03 0.11∗ 0.09∗∗
(1.18) (1.24) (−0.01) (−0.28) (1.94) (2.44)
High 0.13 12.46 0.69∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(1.05) (0.48) (3.01) (2.41) (3.32) (2.45)
High−Low 0.31∗ 14.84 1.09∗∗∗ 0.35∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(1.86) (0.38) (3.59) (1.95) (4.38) (3.91)
Observations 3723 3723 3723 3723 3723 3723
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Table 10: Returns sorted on PINC and degree of business localization
This table reports average DGTW-adjusted monthly returns sorted by prior year PINC and prior
year state-name counts–where state-name counts are the number of unique states mentioned in a firms
10-K statement (See Garcia and Norli 2012). State-name counts are a rough proxy for the geographic
scope of a firm’s operations. These data are available only for the years 1996 to 2008. Column 1
reports average market-adjusted returns by per capita proprietary income growth rate quintile for the
full sample of firms from 1996 to 2008. Column 2 reports the same, but for a sample of firms with only
one state mentioned in the firms annual 10-k statement. Column 3 reports the same, but for a sample
of firms with with five or fewer state-name counts. Columns 2 through five report the same results as
Column 1 limiting the sample to only firms that have operations in one state (Column 2), only firms
that have operations in five or fewer states (Column 3), only firms that have operations 6 – 10 states
(Column 4), and only firms with operations in more then 10 states (Column 5). t-statistic are reported
in parentheses, and are calculated using White standard errors. One, two, and three asterisks denotes
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1996-2008 1 state ≤ 5 states 6− 10 states > 10 states
PINC quintile Ri −RDGTW Ri −RDGTW Ri −RDGTW Ri −RDGTW Ri −RDGTW
Low −0.30∗∗∗ 0.38 −0.24∗ −0.30∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗
(−3.67) (1.01) (−1.77) (−2.10) (−2.74)
2 −0.24∗∗∗ −0.58∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.11 −0.38∗∗∗
(−3.98) (−2.15) (−2.68) (−0.95) (−4.11)
3 −0.01 0.67∗∗ 0.19∗∗ −0.08 −0.27∗∗∗
(−0.12) (2.29) (1.97) (−0.62) (−2.90)
4 −0.24∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.17∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗
(−4.31) (−0.23) (−1.92) (−3.48) (−4.31)
High 0.34∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.20∗ 0.04
(5.26) (3.21) (5.80) (1.69) (0.44)
High−Low 0.64∗∗∗ 0.53 0.83∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗
(6.13) (1.12) (4.90) (2.70) (2.47)
Observations 374659 20642 177225 105366 130527
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Table 11: Return predictability conditional on industry-human-capital intensity
This table reports regression results for the following equation Ri,I,t − Rf,t = α + βPINCa,t−1 +
ζPINCa,t−1×Human CapitalI,t−1+γHuman CapitalI,t−1+εa,t, whereRi,I,t−Rf,t is the annual excess
return of firm i in industry I at time t and Human CapitalI,t−1 is a proxy for industry human-capital-
intensity. Three different measures of industry human-capital intensity are used. Column 1 uses the
value-weighted industry-average number of patents per firm (log(1 + Number patents per firm)). Col-
umn 2 uses the value-weighted industry-average Selling, General and Administrative Expenses (SG&A)
per employee per firm (log(1+SG&A/Employees)). SG&A is commonly used as a proxy for firm wages.
Column 3 uses the value-weighted industry-average R&D per firm (log(1+R&D)). Standard errors are
clustered on year and firm, and t-statistic are reported in parentheses. Additionally, to diminish the
effect of outliers, I require that there be at least five firms per industry within an area in the previous
year to be included in the sample. One, two, and three asterisks denotes statistical significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Ri −Rf Ri −Rf Ri −Rf
PINC 0.04 −3.46∗ 0.10
(0.15) (−1.84) (0.38)
PINC × log(Industry average patents) 1.06∗∗
(2.05)
log(Industry average patents) 2.32
(0.57)
PINC × log(Industry average wage) 1.28∗∗
(1.99)
log(Industry average wage) −0.84
(−0.16)
PINC × log(Industry average R&D) 10.16∗
(1.85)
log(Industry average R&D) 8.13
(0.21)
Constant 3.38 8.61 5.07
(1.03) (0.55) (1.52)
Observations 32492 38599 38586
R2 0.014 0.012 0.012
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Table 12: Regression of area returns on PINC and matched PINC
An area’s dominant industry is defined as the industry with the largest market share within a given area
each year over the longest period of time. For example, I find that from 1970 to 2009 the Oil Industry
has had the largest industry market share for Houston 39 out of its 39 years in the sample. Thus, I
define Houston’s dominant industry as Oil. The area with the same dominant industry as a with the
highest number of years of dominance is assigned a’s Matched PINC. To be included in the sample, I
require each area to have at least 20 years of observations with at least 20 firms in the previous year, and
to be matched to another area/industry pair. These filters decrease the sample to 13 economic areas.
Each row of this table represents regressions for a different economic area. The first column reports
the economic area, and the second and third columns its dominant industry with the corresponding
percentage of years the dominant industry has been dominant. The fourth column reports the area’s
matched industry-area pair EA number. The fifth column reports the PINC coefficient estimate from
a regression of area portfolio annual returns on lagged PINC (Ra,t −Rf,t = α+ βPINCa,t−1 + εa,t).
The last column reports the Matched PINC coefficient estimate from a regression of area portfolio
annual returns on the lagged matched area PINC (Ra,t − Rf,t = η + γMatched PINCa,t−1 + εa,t).
t-statistic are reported in parentheses, and are calculated using White standard errors. One, two, and
three asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic area Dom. industry % EA match PINC Matched PINC
11 - Atlanta 34 - Bus. Services 59 118 −0.35 0.56
(−0.43) (1.11)
31 - Charlotte 43 - Retail 45 33 −0.62 0.22
(−0.52) (0.21)
32 - Chicago 21 - Machinery 58 108 1.04∗ −0.98
(1.76) (−1.31)
33 - Cincinnati 43 - Retail 43 31 −0.05 1.38
(−0.05) (1.46)
42 - Dallas 30 - Oil 85 75 0.31 −0.02
(0.50) (−0.04)
45 - Denver 30 - Oil 97 75 0.40 0.05
(0.52) (0.06)
75 - Houston 30 - Oil 100 45 0.32 1.04
(0.50) (1.28)
108 - Milwaukee 21 - Machinery 100 32 −1.20∗∗ 0.75
(−2.07) (1.20)
118 - New York 34 - Bus. Services 85 174 0.36 0.75
(0.85) (0.55)
128 - Phoenix 37 - Electronics 81 131 1.19∗∗∗ 1.67
(2.83) (1.64)
131 - Portland 37 - Electronics 73 128 2.05∗∗ 0.60
(2.25) (1.41)
146 - San Jose 37 - Electronics 78 128 2.09∗ 0.50
(1.84) (0.80)
174 - DC 34 - Bus. Services 50 118 0.26 0.42
(0.18) (0.92)
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Table 13: Return predictability conditional on aggregate house price growth
This table reports DGTW-adjusted monthly returns for firms sorted according to their prior years’
PINC conditional on whether proprietor financial constraints tightened or weakened over the previous
year. Two proxies are used to measure changes in proprietor financial constraints: the growth rate
(log difference) of the annual real home price index for the U.S. and the growth rate (log difference)
of the ratio of collateralizable housing wealth to non-collateralizable human wealth where the housing
collateral stock is measured by the market value of residential real estate wealth (See Lustig and Van
Nieuwerburgh 2005). The first two columns reports returns for firms sorted according to their prior
years’ PINC conditional on whether aggregate housing prices rose (Column 1) or fell (Column 2) over
the prior year. Columns 3 and 4 report similar results sorting on housing collateral ratio growth. These
results are only for the years 1970 to 2002—i.e., the years for which housing collateral data is available.
t-statistic are reported in parentheses, and are calculated using White standard errors. One, two, and
three asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All 1970-2002 1970-2002
HPG > 0 HPG < 0 HCG > 0 HCG < 0
PINC quintile Ri −RDGTW Ri −RDGTW Ri −RDGTW Ri −RDGTW
Low −0.22∗∗∗ 0.10 −0.22∗∗∗ −0.00
(−4.06) (1.60) (−3.76) (−0.01)
2 −0.16∗∗∗ 0.10∗ −0.12∗∗ 0.02
(−3.51) (1.70) (−2.14) (0.24)
3 −0.02 −0.03 −0.05 −0.08
(−0.55) (−0.57) (−1.15) (−1.33)
4 −0.08∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.04 −0.25∗∗∗
(−2.03) (−2.94) (−0.91) (−4.24)
High 0.18∗∗∗ −0.05 0.20∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(4.37) (−0.89) (4.84) (−4.19)
High − Low 0.4∗∗∗ −0.15∗ 0.42∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(5.87) (−1.81) (5.88) (−2.57)
Observations 603203 308518 489009 272163
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Table 14: Regression of market premium on PINC 146
This table reports time-series regressions for the following equation Rm,t−Rf,t = α+ζPINC Factor+
βPINC 146t−1 + ηCAYt−1 + ζD/Pt−1 + γTerm spread + δDefault spread + εt where Rm,t − Rf,t
is CRSP value-weighted annual market portfolio excess return, PINC Factor is a common factor
across the PINC time-series for all EAs, PINC 146 is the PINC from EA 146: the San Jose-San
Francisco-Oakland, CA economic area, i.e., the Silicon Valley region, D/P is the payout adjusted log
dividend-yield, i.e. the dividend yield adjusted for aggregate net equity issuance (See Boudoukh et al.),
CAY is the consumption wealth ratio, Default spread is the monthly difference in a Baa versus a Aaa
corporate bond yield averaged each year, and Term spread is the annual difference in a long-horizon
T-bond rate (10 year bond) minus the 3 month T-bill rate. For this table all predictor variables are
standardized to have zero mean and unit variance to aid in regression coefficient comparisons. The
final column reports results using HML, the value premium, as the dependent variable. Columns 4 and
5 report results for a sample conditional on lagged housing price growth being positive. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses, and are calculated using White standard errors. One, two, and three asterisks
denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HPG > 0 HPG > 0
MKTRF MKTRF MKTRF MKTRF MKTRF HML
PINC Factor 6.89∗∗∗
(2.98)
PINC 146 6.03∗∗ 5.54∗ 8.19∗∗∗ 9.24∗∗∗ 0.16
(2.23) (1.98) (4.31) (4.84) (0.06)
Dividend yield 4.50 4.95∗
(1.66) (2.01)
CAY 7.67∗∗ 6.00
(2.30) (1.71)
Term spread 0.81 0.82
(0.26) (0.22)
Default spread 2.19 −2.70
(0.68) (−0.47)
Constant 6.38∗∗ 6.26∗∗ 5.34∗ 6.38∗∗ 6.03∗ 4.65∗
(2.27) (2.18) (1.94) (2.28) (2.04) (1.88)
Observations 39 39 39 26 26 39
R2 0.129 0.104 0.325 0.246 0.437 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.080 0.222 0.215 0.297 −0.027
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